Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

Utah v. David E. Brown : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; Dan R. Larsen; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
repsondent.
Frances M. Palacios, Joan C. Watt, Richard G. Uday; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorneys for
appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. David E. Brown, No. 870504 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/701

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

^"AH
::3CUMENT
< HU
50

A10
DOCKET NO.

)F APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Hf-tat

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Cajse No. 870504-CA
P r i o r i t y No. 2

DAVID E. BROWN
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as
amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B* Brian, judge, presiding.

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
JOAN C. WATT
RICHARD G. UDAY
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 Eabt 500 South
Salt L&ke City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAN R. LARSEN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
OCT 20 1988
COURT OF APPEALS

IN n u j u)UUi

|

| PHIAL » Dl

Ml,

. TATE

)b 111 MI

i inn,
Pldinlif f/Respondent-,
V.
II

Case No. 8/UbU 1 \
Priority No. 2
Defendant 'Appellant:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Apppa] from n judgment and conviction for Theft:, i third
degree felony, \ t\ nolarion
• nut .,;<-.. ,

if II ih

11i

nn

^fi-b-MW

in I IIH ||,I, | m,|, , r, | insliitl tuinl

! 9S ?

in mil I MI

^
,dlt l.dk^

County, State ot Utah, the Honorable Pat B. Hrian, Judge, presiding

FRANCES M. PALACIOS
JOAN C. WATT
RICHARD G. UDAY
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
424 East 500 South
Salr. Lake City, Utan 34111
M

DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
DAN R. LARSEN
ASSISTANT

ATTORmiT GENERAL

236 State Capito]. Building
Salt- Lake City, Utah 84114
/I I

M l '

I

I > fi 111 I 111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN DENYING MR. BROWN'S PRETRIAL MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF
MISDEMEANOR THEFT

2

POINT II. MR. BROWN DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL
BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY AS GUARANTEED HIM BY BOTH
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

7

CONCLUSION

16

ii

TABLE OP AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES CITED
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)

15, 16

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d
543 (1965)

8

Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482 (9th
Cir. 1987)

11, 13

Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764
(5th Cir. 1986)

12, 13

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71
L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)

9

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)

3, 7

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)
State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124,

P.2d

14, 15
(1988). .

State v. Burton, 676 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1984)

5, 6, 7
5, 6, 7

State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984)

2, 3

State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988)

10, 14

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987)

3

State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986)

11

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987)

15

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)

15

State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987)

9, 10

State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985)

9, 10

State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)
United States v. Ackridge, 370 F.Supp. 214 (E.D.Pa.
1973)
United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267 (D.C.Cir. 1971) . .

iii

15

4
4

PAGE
United States v. Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa.
1976)

4

United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982) . .
United States v. Gonzalez, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.
1981)
United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1972) . . .
United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C.Cir.
1976)
United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir.
1978)
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C.Cir. 1976). . .

4
4
4
4
4
3, 4, 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution

7

Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution

7

Fourteenth Amendment, United states Constitution

7

Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution

7

Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution

7

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b) (1983)
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 606(b) (1975)

11, 12
11

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a) (1983)

2, 3, 4

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a) (1975)

2, 3, 4

Conference Report to Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule
606(b) (1975)
Preliminary Note, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)

iv

11
3, 7

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

DAVID E. BROWN

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 870504-CA
Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief
(Brief of Appellant at iv, 1-3). Mr. Brown takes this opportunity
to reply to Respondent's Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Theft crimes are not crimes of dishonesty or false
statement under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Federal case law guides the interpretation of the Rules of Evidence
and overwhelmingly indicates that the trial court erred
prejudicially by ruling to admit prior theft convictions to impeach
Mr. Brown.

That ruling kept Mr. Brown from testifying on his own

behalf in violation of his constitutional rights to do so.
Prejudicial error occurs when a juror fails to answer a
material question on voir dire examination and later deliberates

using information which discloses the failure to have truthfully
answered the voir dire question.

Further, jurors may not deliberate

before the case is submitted to them, nor may they presume the
accused to be guilty.

Reversible error occurred in Mr. Brown's case

when the trial court refused to acknowledge the above errors and
denied Mr. Brown's motion for a new trial, violating his due process
rights and his constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial
jury.

ARGOMENT

POINT I
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
DENYING MR. BROWNfS PRETRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF MISDEMEANOR
THEFT.
The State mistakenly relies on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d
33 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that theft crimes are crimes of
dishonesty.

Brief of Respondent at 7.

The State v. Cintron per

curiam opinion was decided under the old rules of evidence and does
not reflect the new direction taken in Utah since adoption of the
federal rules of evidence.

Specifically, State v. Cintron is

inconsistent with Rule 609's more narrow interpretation of
"dishonesty."

See Opening Brief of Appellant at 5-8.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that previous opinions which are
inconsistent with the new direction taken since adopting the federal

-

2

-

rules are overruled.
(Utah 1986).

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 n. 40

State v. Cintron is just such an opinion and therefore

should be considered overruled.
This analysis is buttressed by footnote 45 of State v.
Banner where the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the
prosecutor's reliance on case law established prior to Rule 609(a)
at the trial level was significant—and presumably unpersuasive on
appeal.

Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Bar

Commission's Rules Committee's Preliminary Note to the Utah Rules of
Evidence indicate a serious commitment to using the adoption of the
federal rules of evidence as a fresh starting place for the law of
evidence in this state, taking aim at seeking uniformity between the
rules by looking to the federal rules for interpretation.

State v.

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1333-34. The State v. Cintron opinion violates
this new direction and is inappropriately relied on by the State for
its base proposition.
Mr. Brown's reliance on State v. Banner, supra, and
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), is not intended to blur
the (a)(1) and (a)(2) subsections of Rule 609 as implied by the
State (Brief of Respondent at 7-8); rather, both cases were cited to
demonstrate the Utah Supreme Court's posture since adopting the
federal rules of evidence emphasizing the Court's expressed intent
to rely on federal case law to guide the evidence rules questions.
In State v. Banner, the Utah Supreme Court cited United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for an historical perspective
of the development of Rule 609(a).

-

That historical review discloses

3 -

the congressional debate of the rule and the revisions undertaken
prior to adopting the rule.
Although United States v. Smith, supra, did involve
crimes other than the theft crimes at issue in this case, United
States v. Smith remains persuasive in deciding whether theft crimes
are crimes of dishonesty or false statement as meant by Rule
609(a)(2) because Smith speaks directly to the point of what
Congress meant by the phrase, often citing the congressional
record.

See Opening Brief of Appellant at 7.

United States v.

Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976), similarly offers guidance
to this Court despite a difference in the specific crimes being
examined.

Among many cases, United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d

188, 190 (10th Cir. 1978), directly indicates that robbery,
burglary, and theft convictions are not included within the term
"dishonesty or false statement" as meant by Rule 609(a)(2).

See

also United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), and
Howard v. Gonzalez, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981), cited in
Mr. Brown's opening brief.

Opening Brief of Appellant at 8.

United States v. Smith, supra, discloses the misplaced
reliance by the state to the contrary, citing United States v.
Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Ackridge,
370 F.Supp. 214 (E.D.Pa. 1973); United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257
(3rd Cir. 1972); and United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).

Three of these four cases pre-date Congress' adoption

of the federal rules of evidence.

The fourth case, United States v.

Bianco, supra, decided after the enactment of the federal rules,

-
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relied only upon pre-federal rules cases.

As the District of

Columbia Circuit Court pointed out in United States v. Smith, supra,
"[t]he simple answer to the government's argument is that none of
these cases involved Rule 609."

551 F.2d at 364. The Smith court

further explained that these opinions relying on pre-609 cases "are
not controlling in this case and indeed are essentially
irrelevant." _lc|* at 365. The enactment of the federal rules in
1975, and their adoption in Utah in 1983, represented significant
changes in the treatment of prior convictions as impeachment
evidence.

The burden shifted, the judge's discretion was altered,

and the analysis is distinct.

Cases predating these changes

therefore do not offer helpful insights.

The cases relied on in the

State's brief are not persuasive.
Finally, the State cites as supplemental authority a
recent Washington case, State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124,
P.2d

(1988), to support their premise that theft crimes are

crimes of dishonesty.

While State v. Brown does indicate the

Washington Supreme Court's position that theft crimes are crimes of
dishonesty, the opinion jji toto supports the claims of our
appellant, Mr. Brown.
In State v. Brown, supra, the Washington Supreme Court
overruled a prior decision, State v. Burton, 676 P.2d 975 (Wash.
1984), which had patterned its decision after federal law.

Burton,

676 P.2d at 981. The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Brown,
supra, recanted that earlier decision noting that, while their
Evidence Rule 609(a) was also a verbatim replica of the federal

-
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rule, Washington was free to interpret the language differently,
reaching this decision, the Court stated:
[0]ur heavy reliance in Burton upon federal
legislative history and upon federal decisional
law was misguided. When we sought to resolve the
"confusion and controversy" as to whether theft
crimes are within ER 609(a)(2) by examining
federal law, we lost sight of basic principles we
generally employ in construing rules we have
authored.
First, of course, is the principle that federal
case law interpreting the federal rule is not
binding upon this court. Simply because our rule
is identical to the federal rule does not require
us to interpret our rule in the same fashion, nor
could it require us to do so. . . .
Second, we have grave reservations about
whether the federal courts' restrictive
construction of Rule 609(a)(2) to exclude per se
admissibility of prior theft convictions is
analytically sound. As we have noted, the federal
courts place great weight on the definition
accorded the phrase "dishonesty or false
statement" found in federal legislative history.
We think that in relying upon the congressional
committee reports' definition, courts have
overlooked the language of the rule itself. The
rule is stated in the disjunctive, "dishonest or
false statement." . . .
Rather than concentrating on federal
interpretation of the federal rule, we will
examine the meaning of ER 609(a)(2) without using
federal case law and federal legislative.history
as a starting point.
State v. Brown,

P.2d at

(emphasis added).

The reasoning

employed by the Washington Supreme Court to support its deviation
from the federal law is contrary to Utah's stated position and is
therefore inappropriate support under both stated reasons.
First, Utah, unlike Washington, expressed an intention
from the outset of adopting the federal rules to seek uniformity
with evidence law between the federal and Utah courts by explicit

-
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directing Utah courts to look to federal decisions for guidance.
State v. Bannery 717 P.2d 1333-34 (citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d
1313, 1317 (Utah 1986)); Preliminary Note, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983).
Second, the Washington Supreme Court, both in State v,
Burton, supra, and State v. Brown, supra, conceded that the
overwhelming federal position is that theft crimes are not crimes of
dishonesty or false statement as meant by Rule 609(a)(2).
676 P.2d at 981; Brown,

P.2d at

Burton,

.

Accordingly, this Court should not deviate from the
federal rules as did the Washington Supreme Court.

This Court

should find that theft is not a crime of dishonesty or false
statement and that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying
Mr. Brown's motion in limine to suppress the prior convictions.
Mr. Brown's case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial
where such prejudicial error does not occur.

POINT II
(Reply to Respondent's Points II and III)
MR. BROWN DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL BY AN
IMPARTIAL JURY AS GUARANTEED HIM BY BOTH THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
At issue in both Points II and III of Appellant's opening
brief and the State's answer is whether Mr. Brown received his
constitutionally guaranteed fair trial by an impartial jury.

Fifth,

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States Constitution;
Article I, Sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution.

-
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The State answers

the issue in both points with claims that no error occurred, or that
if error occurred it was harmless (Brief of Respondent at 9-22). The
State further contends that Mr. Brown wasn't able to prove his
assertions of error because the affidavits provided by his counsel
were not established (Brief of Respondent at 10) and/or were
actually stricken by the trial court (Brief of Respondent at 17).
The State's position is without merit and must fail.
First, the trial court refused to allow an inquiry into
the nature of the statements which prompted the jury to send out the
question, "Does statements made by jurors during recess that
disturbed some members render our verdict invalid?"
92).

(R. 87, 155 at

The trial court opted instead to merely admonish the jury to

decide the case solely on the law and the evidence presented in
court (R. 155 at 93).

Such a belated admonition failed to protect

Mr. Brown's right to an impartial jury.
Case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Utah
Supreme Court, and this Court, disclose the error of the trial judge
and mandate reversal of Mr. Brown's conviction.
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. Fairness of course
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness . . . . [T]o perform its high function
in the best way "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (citing in part Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1955)).
The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at
the very heart of due process. [0]ur common-law

-
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heritage, our Constitution, and our experience in
applying that Constitution have committed us
irrevocably to the position that the criminal
trial has one well-defined purpose—to provide a
fair and reliable determination of guilt.
[A]lthough a juror may be sincere when he says
that he was fair and impartial to the defendant,
the psychological impact requiring such a
declaration before one's fellows is often its
father. It is the nature of the practices here
challenged that proof of actual harm, or lack of
harm, is virtually impossible to adduce.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)(citations and quotations
omitted).
The possibility that improper contacts may
influence a juror in ways he or she may not even
be able to recognize and that a defendant may be
left with questions as to the impartiality of the
jury, leads us to the conclusion that when the
contact is more than incidental, the burden is on
the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized
contact did not influence the jury.
Indeed, even if the jurors had denied they were
influenced by the encounter in the post-trial
hearing, that is not enough to rebut the
presumption of prejudice.
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280-81 (Utah 1985).
The Pike Court explained that "[a]nything more
than the most incidental contact during the trial
between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the
impartiality of the jury and at best gives the
appearance of the absence of impartiality." The
Court stated that Utah has adopted a stringent
rule that "prejudice may well exist even though a
person who has been tainted may not himself, be
able to recognize that fact." . . . The Court held
[in Pike] the juror's denial of prejudice or
influence was, therefore, insufficient to overcome
the presumption, and the mistrial should have been
granted.
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah App. 1987)(quoting State v.
Pike, 712 p.2d at 279-80).

-
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Accordingly, prejudicial error occurred in Mr. Brown's
case when the trial judge refused to conduct an inquiry into the
statements which the jurors themselves found to be troubling enough
to ask whether their decision would be valid.1

That error was

compounded when the trial judge denied the motion for a new trial
which was supported by affidavits detailing the impermissible
exchanges between jurors both before and during deliberations.2

The

prejudice revealed and appropriately presumed from the question by
the jury and/or the statements made by Juror Hogan cannot be
rebutted by reliance upon either the belated group admonition given
by the trial judge in response to the jury's question (R. 155 at
93), nor the individual polling after pronouncement of the verdict
(R. 155 at 96-97).

See cases cited supra on this point.

1

Notably, in both State v. Pike, supra, and State v.
Larocco, supra, the trial court held a hearing with the particular
jurors and witnesses involved to determine what had occurred. Such
a hearing was asked for and denied in the case at bar (R. 155 at
92-93); the presumption for prejudice should therefore stand
unrebutted in this case. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280,
seemingly requiring an exhaustive inquiry; see also State v.
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Utah 1988)(Stewart, J., dissenting
opinion).
2
The affidavit of Juror Blain revealed (1) that Juror
Hogan argued retail sales experience during deliberations when he
had failed to acknowledge any such experience during voir dire, and
(2) that statements derogatory to Mr. Brown had been exchanged
between jurors before deliberations reflecting an attitude that
Juror Hogan appeared to have predetermined Mr. Brown's guilt before
the case had even been submitted to the jury (R. 138-39).
Specifically, Juror Hogan had made a reference to the accused as
"that black guy." He had also stated, "[S]he, [defense counsel],
doesn't need to worry with that guy." At another point, he said,
"Book 'em, Danno" in reference to Mr. Brown. (R. 156 at 7.) All
these statements were understood by Juror Blain as indication that
juror Hogan had predetermined Mr. Brown's guilt.

- 10
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Second, the State maintains the trial court correctly
struck the affidavits from use at the motion for a new trial. At the
State's urging the court relied on Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence to strike the affidavits.

Under the circumstances of the

case, that ruling by the trial court was erroneous. Rule 606(b) may
not apply at all to the facts of this case, and even if it does
apply* the affidavit presented to the trial court fits within the
expressed exception to the rule.
As Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is a
verbatim replica of the federal rule, federal intent and case law
guides the proper interpretation.

See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313

(Utah 1986); see also discussion in Point I, supra, at 2-6. The
Conference Report to Rule 606(b) of the federal Rules of Evidence
discusses both the House bill and Senate bill versions of the rule.
The Conference Report then specifies:
The Conference adopts the Senate amendment. The
Conferees believe that jurors should be encouraged
to be conscientious in properly reporting to the
court misconduct that occurs during jury
deliberations.
Various federal courts have held that Rule 606(b) does not bar the
introduction of statements which demonstrate the failure of a juror
to answer material voir dire questions.

Hard v. Burlington Northern

Railroad, 812 F.2d 482, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1987)(statements which tend
to show deceit during voir dire are not barred by Rule 606(b) and
the court below abused its discretion in so ruling and in failing to
hold a hearing to investigate that a juror failed to honestly answer
a material voir dire question);

Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific

- 11
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Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 769-70 (5th Cir. 1986)(no error was found
because appellant did not allege that a juror failed to disclose
important information during voir dire; giving false information or
withholding information during voir dire is an exception to Rule
606(b)).
Howeverf even if the rule does applyf the affidavits
presented in this case fit within the exception articulated within
the rule itself.

The rule states:

Rule 606.

Competency of juror as witness.

(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of
a verdict or indictment/ a juror may not testify
as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith/ except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor
may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by
him concerning a matter about which he would be
precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
Rule 606(b)/ Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)(emphasis added).

In this

case Juror Hogan did not respond to any of the trial court's six
different questions of whether the jurors had worked directly or
indirectly in the retail sales business (R. 155 at 36-38).

Juror

Hogan thenf however/ argued to his fellow jurors by referring during
deliberations to his prior employment in retail sales (R. 139).

- 12
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As the crime charged against Mr, Brown was retail theft,
the questions asked Juror Hogan were material.

If he had answered

the questions properly, Juror Hogan would have been subjected to
follow-up questions and inquiries aimed at revealing any bias he may
have had.

When Juror Hogan failed to answer the questions but then

utilized that experience to support his position in deliberations he
frustrated the purpose of voir dire precluding possible challenges
for cause or peremptory challenges.

Any use of the information

undisclosed to the court and counsel during voir dire is therefore
extraneous information.

See Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad,

supra; and Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., supra.

The

statements of prior retail experiences by Juror Hogan in
deliberations were improperly before the other jurors. Juror Blain
recognized the inconsistency, and this Court should also conclude
that Juror Hogan's arguments in deliberations were improperly before
the jury, were prejudicial to Mr. Brown, and were extraneous as
meant by the rule. Moreover, the action of Juror Hogan violated
Mr. Brown's due process rights and his right to an impartial jury
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.3

3 The case at bar is distinct from State v. DeMille, 756
P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), where the accused claimed error because jurors
relied on personal experiences. In DeMille counsel for the accused
declined to ask about such personal experiences which the Court
characterized as "quite foreseeable." 756 P.2d at 83. In the case
at bar the "quite foreseeable" inquiry at issue was asked of
prospective jurors. Juror Hogan failed to answer that question
(repeated six times) consistently with his deliberation statements.
The implication of DeMille is that had the question been asked there
and events proceeded as in this case error would have occurred. Id.

- 13
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The affidavit of Juror Blain fits within the exception of
Rule 606(b) and should have been accepted by the trial court. A
ruling by this Court to the contrary subjects Rule 606(b) to an
unconstitutional as applied challenge inasmuch as the rule must give
way and fall when balanced against the constitutional rights, both
federal and state, of Mr. Brown to due process and a fair trial by
an impartial jury.

This Court should accept the affidavits as

admissible and probative evidence supporting the rebuttable
presumption that Mr. Brown was prejudiced because he did not receive
his fair trial at the hands of an impartial jury.
Finally, the State contends that even if any errors
occurred in this trial they were harmless because of the strength of
the case against Mr. Brown.

Brief of Respondent at 16-22.

claim is untenable on the facts of this case.

That

The doctrine of

harmless error, as provided in case law, is at its most stringent
when examining violations of constitutional dimensions. Justice
Zimmerman in his concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439
(Utah 1988) , noted:
This Court has yet to squarely decide whether the
harmless error standard applicable to violations
of the state constitution is the erosion of
confidence standard or the stricter federal
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
Id. at 500 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result)(citing State v.
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-05 & n.3 (Utah 1987)).

Either standard

adopted in Utah would require a finding that the errors herein were
not harmless.

- 14
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The facts of this case go much beyond the evidentiary
errors discussed in State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987)(trial court erred in limiting defendant's cross-examination by
misinterpreting rule of evidence but error was harmless); State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)(the State committed reversible
error by failing to provide requested discovery of two witnesses who
gave unanticipated testimony); or State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498
(Utah 1986)(trial court erred in limiting cross examination for bias
but error was harmless because jury was already aware of such
bias).

In this case, the errors are more than otherwise

inadmissible evidence reaching the jury or evidence improperly
excluded from the jury; the errors which occurred in this case go to
the heart of Mr. Brown's constitutional rights to a fair trial by
impartial jurors.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8

(1967)(citing cases indicating that some constitutional rights are
so fundamental that their infraction can never be harmless error).
Predeliberation statements such as "[S]he [defense
counsel] doesn't need to worry with that guy," "that black guy," and
"book'em Danno," heard and interpreted by other jurors as a
predetermination of Mr. Brown's guilt, cannot be said to fail to
erode the confidence in the verdict.

Even if somehow those

statements could fail to erode the confidence of this Court in the
verdict below surely under the federal constitution's more stringent
test, the State would be unable to show that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at

23-25.
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Mr. Brown was denied his state and federal constitutional
rights to testify in his own behalf; he was denied his state's
federal constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
These errors mandate that this Court reverse the conviction of
Mr. Brown and remand the case for a new trial absent such
constitutional errors.

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, as well as those
articulated in the opening brief, Mr. Brown respectfully requests
that this Court grant his appeal, reverse his conviction, and remand
to the trial court for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ~Q

day of October, 1988.

?RANCES^M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorney--foT)

Defendant/Appellant

LICHARD G. UDA1
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